Seminário NOVAFRICA: “No Kin In The Game: Moral Hazard and War in the U.S. Congress”

Na quarta-feira, 10 de Outubro, pelas 14h30, o Centro NOVAFRICA recebe Eoin McGuirk de Tufts University, para apresentar o seu trabalho.

Author:
Eoin McGuirk, Tufts University

Abstract:

Why do wars occur? We exploit a natural experiment to test the longstanding hypothesis that leaders declare war because they fail to internalize the associated costs. We test this moral hazard theory of conflict by compiling data on 9,210 children of 3,693 US legislators who served in the U.S. Congress during the four conscription-era wars of the 20th century: World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. We test for agency problems by comparing the voting behavior of legislators with draft-age sons versus draft-age daughters. We estimate that (i) having a draft-age son reduces legislator support for pro-conscription bills by 10-17%; (ii) support for conscription increases by a quarter as a legislator’s son crosses the upper age threshold; and (iii) legislators with draft-age sons are more likely to win reelection on average. These results are consistent with a political agency model in which voters update their beliefs about politicians’ motives when they make unpopular legislative decisions. Our findings provide new evidence that agency problems contribute to political violence, and that elected officials can be influenced by changing private incentives.

Para saber mais informações sobre este seminário clique aqui.