Political Voice and Public Goods Provision
Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Uganda

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Abstract

In recent years, many policies have been implemented to increase the presence of certain underrepresented groups, like women, in decision-making bodies. The effect of the increase in political voice of those groups in the context of informal institutions remains unclear. This paper aims to understand the relationship between political voice and contributions to the community, using a modified version of a Public Goods game (PGG) in rural Uganda. The proposed PGG, examines the effect of increasing political voice on public good provision through an exogenous empowerment manipulation. Results suggest that empowered people contribute slightly more than individuals that do not have voting power in a decision that affects the community. Furthermore, this effect is only present when the participants experience the change on status in the group, suggesting that they are sensitive to changes in the social position. The design includes two novel components; 1) an external variation on empowerment, in the form of inclusion in a decision-making process, and 2) the use of the strategy method to decide the contributions, which allows separating the effect of political voice on contributions coming from agency and the effect coming from increasing the probability of the sector you prefer being chosen.

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1 Introduction

Compared to other aspects of the gender gap, as the economical, educational, and legal, the gender gap in political representation has narrowed the least between 1995-2005 (Duflo [2012]). Worldwide only 23% of the parliamentarians are women [1]. As of June 2016, 46 countries' [2] single or lower houses were composed of more than 30% of women, the target set by the U.N. Economic and Social Council in 1990. Of those 46 countries, 14 are in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this region, the average of women MPs is around 23%, with high variance across countries. As we can see in Table 1 of the Appendix, Rwanda leads the region's numbers with 63.8% [3] and Nigeria closes the table with 3.6% of women MPs.

In Africa, more than half of the countries have adopted quotas in order to increase the presence of women in the decision making bodies. In countries without quotas, only 11% of the MPs are women, compared to 24% when quotas are adopted. The most popular type of quota system has been the *Reserved Seats*, compared to other regions in the world where *Candidate Lists* is the preferred system (Clayton et al. [2017]). Increasing representation has been a major concern for most of the governments in the region, under the premise that both descriptive and substantive representation would increase. But does the increase of presence of women in decision-making positions affect policy outcomes?

Previous studies have found that the identity of the policy maker affects policy decision (Chattopadhyay and Duflo [2004], Levitt [1996], and Pande [2003]). In particular, the study by Chattopadhyay and Duflo [2004] finds that in councils with reserved seats in India, more money is allocated to policy domains prioritized by women. This study suggests the need for further research on the area, mentioning specifically that there are "implications beyond reservation policy, suggesting that, even at the lowest level of a decentralized government, all mechanisms that affect politician's identity may affect policy decision".

In many of these countries, a considerable amount of the policy making activity takes place at the local level, i.e. at the districts, councils or local meetings. In Africa, many countries have experienced a strong decentralization process and decision making in community meetings has strong implications for development, as members decide on important issues such as road maintenance, electing leaders, solving social conflicts, allocation of resources, and petitions to higher scale of government. Often, these institutions have a rather informal system and organization, which makes it very difficult to impose quotas or other formal system aiming to increase the presence of women.

At local level, participation of women in meetings and other types of activities is still substantially lower. In Table 1 we can see that the gap between men and women that attended a community meeting more than once in the past year is on average 10% in Africa. Furthermore, 13% less women join others to raise an issue to their local politicians.

[1] June 2016

[2] Out of the total of 195 countries worldwide

[3] Rwanda leads also the world percentage of women MPs.

Table 1: Community Participation in Africa by gender

Africa	Attend comm meeting			Join others raise issue		
Region	**Men**	**Women**	**Gap**	**Men**	**Women**	**Gap**
North	36%	23%	14	37%	23%	15
Southern	58%	53%	6	43%	37%	6
East	69%	58%	11	56%	40%	16
West	62%	48%	14	58%	40%	18
Central	47%	41%	6	52%	45%	7
Average	57%	47%	10	50%	37%	13

Note 1: % who say "once or twice", "several times", or "often"

Note 2: Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 131. Pauline M. Wambua. *Weak support and limited participation hinder women's political leadership in North Africa.* Jan 2017. Data from 2016 wave

The effects of the increase in political voice of those groups in the context of informal institutions remains unclear. In this paper I design a Public Good Game (PGG) that aims to explore the role that political voice has on contributions to public goods. In particular I aim to answer the following questions: a) the extent to which an increase in the political voice affects public good provision; b) if it affects differently men and women; c) if the gender composition of the group in which they make decisions affects contributions and in which way; and d) if the decrease in political voice also affects contributions.

The game was conducted in rural Uganda, in a post-war area, in the north of the country. In these areas, individuals make decisions in community meetings and, given the level of decentralization of the government, their competencies include allocation of public funds, selection of projects to undertake and selection of leaders among others. Each game involved 10 participants, randomly selected from the rural communities, to sum up to a total of 290 participants. The gender composition of the groups varied; half of the games with majority of women and the other half with majority of men.

The contribution of this project is twofold. First, compared to previous studies that use existing networks to analyse the effect of political voice (leadership positions) in pro-social behaviour (Branas-Garza et al. [2010], d'Exelle and Riedl [2010], Von Rueden et al. [2010], Baldassarri and Grossman [2013], d'Adda [2011]), the design of this experiment identifies the effect of increasing political voice exogenously which solves the problem of selection, i.e. more pro-social individuals becoming leaders. Second, by using the strategy method, this experiment is able to separate the effect that political voice has on contributions coming from the agency by itself and from preferences. We know from previous studies (Chattopadhyay and Duflo [2004], Levitt [1996], Pande [2003]) that giving power to dis-empowered people changes outcomes, but only because the preferences of dis-empowered are different to those of the empowered. With this design I am able to disentangle these two factors.

Results suggest that giving political voice to individuals has a significant effect on the average amount contributed to the public account in the context of a PGG. Comparing individuals empowered using the external manipulation with those not empowered, the former invest, on average, 0.7 Ugandan Shillings more, representing an increase of 9.3% of the total of contributions. Furthermore, this effect is only present in the second round of the game, suggesting that individuals are sensitive

to changes on their agency.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the existing body of literature in the topic. Section 3 outlines the hypothesis tested in with the game. Section 4 discusses the research context, sampling strategy and design of the game. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.

2 Political Voice and Pro-Social Behavior

Political voice is "the ability to express your views and interests and to influence policy and decision-making processes" (Menocal [2014]). It has also been characterized as a fundamental part of someone's well-being by Sen [1999], that argues that participation in the process of someone's development in an open and non-discriminatory way, are fundamental freedoms.

Increasing political voice in minority groups, through voting rights policies or quotas, has proved to be related to change in certain policies. Miller [2008] identifies an increase in local public health spending in states in which state level women suffrage laws were passed in the USA between 1869 and 1920. This change lead to a decrease in child mortality by 8-15%. Similarly, there was an increase in state government expenditures and a shift towards more liberal voting patterns related to the extension of suffrage rights to American women (Lott [1999]).

There is also evidence that increasing the representation of minority groups in parliaments leads to a change in policies. Using data on the introduction of quotas in 139 countries worldwide between 1995 and 2012, Clayton and Zetterberg [2017] find that expenditures in public health increase while those in military sectors decrease, conditional on having a substantial increase in the number of women in the parliament.

In developing countries, there is also evidence that the identity of the policy maker influenced policy decision. In particular, the study by Chattopadhyay and Duflo [2004] finds that, in councils with quotas for women in India, more money is allocated to policy domains prioritized by women. Also in India, Pande [2003] finds that those states which had reserved seats for minorities increased the amount targeted to those groups. Using the same setting, Mani et al. [2011] find that an increase in the number of women in the local councils increased the number of crimes against women reported, although they argue that this is not due to change in policies but just by the presence of more women in political positions.

In Uganda, we find several studies exploring the effect of a quotas system at both national and local level. At national level, Clayton et al. [2017] analyse the minutes of the meetings in the parliament finding that women talk more about women related issues compared to male MPs. The same system of reserved seats is hold at community level, in the district councils, in which a third of the positions is reserved for women councilors. At local level, other study analyzes the minutes of the council meetings they do not find a difference in the type of policies promoted by the female politicians.

There is evidence that a change in electoral rules can shift the power of women within the community and increase their social status (Chattopadhyay and Duflo [2004]). There are several studies that look into this relationship between the social status and the pro-social behavior. There are mixed results, with several studies finding no relationship between this two characteristics (Cassar [2007]; J et al. [2010]; S and DJ [2011]; Apicella et al. [2012]). Some other studies find a positive association, suggesting that more central people in the social networks exhibit higher cooperative behavior (Von Rueden [2011]). Branas-Garza et al. [2010] use an existent social network within undergraduate students in a university and find that more central subjects are more altruistic, using a Dictator Game. In a village in Nicaragua, d'Exelle and Riedl [2010] find that the generosity is only related to centrality in the friendship network, finding no effect in other networks such as the economic and social. In Uganda, Baldassarri and Grossman [2013] also find positive correlation using a public good game. All these studies rely on existent networks, which can lead to some problems of identification, such as reverse causality. Individuals with higher cooperative behavior become more central in the network.

There is an ongoing debate on whether male and female behave differently (Croson and Gneezy [2009]; Eckel and Grossman [2008]; Frank et al. [2011]; Ergun et al. [2012]). Several studies have found that women are more collaborative using a public good game (Seguino et al. [1996]) while others find that men contribute more to a public good than women (Brown-Kruse and Hummels [1993]; Sell and Wilson [1991]; Solow and Kirkwood [2002]). Finally, other studies find no significant differences (Sell et al. [1993]; Cadsby and Maynes [1998]; Andreoni and Petrie [2008]).

3 Theoretical Expectations

Work in progress

Based on the theoretical studies and the empirical evidence described in the previous section, I design a game to be able to test the following hypothesis. These hypotheses are formulated in a testable way and aim to study the relationship between political voice and contributions to community in the context of informal institutions.*Empowerment* is defined as the increase in political voice due to the voting power within the game.

- **Hypothesis 1:** People with voting power contribute more than people that do not have voting power.
- **Hypothesis 2:** People that started off less empowered experience a higher increase in contributions than people that are more empowered

Individuals identify themselves with a group, according with some characteristics and prescriptions to norms and social attitudes (Akerlof and Kranton [2000]). Women contribute more in groups in which all the participants are women in an experiment in Liberia (Fearon et al. [2017]). In slums in Nairobi, women contribute less in a public good game but this effect is offset in the context of all-women groups (Greig and Bohnet [2009]). So I expect to find:

- **Hypothesis 3:** Women in groups in which the majority of the participants are women contribute more than in groups in which the majority of participants are man.

Model

$$u_i(c_i) = w_i - c_i + \delta \sum_{i=1} c_i + \alpha c_i + \theta P \sqrt{c}_i + \mu e_i \sqrt{c}_i$$

Where w_i is the endowment the subject receives and c_i is the contribution to the public account.

δ is the factor of return of the sum of contributions to the public account, $\sum_{i=1} c_i$ by every participant in the game. In this case this factor is constant and equal to 0.5 for all participants.

α is the a factor that measures the value of one's preferences over the other's preferences. I assume $\alpha<1$ since the value people put in their utility is higher than the value they put in the other's utility derived from the return on the contributions.

$P = \{1, 0\}$ is a dummy variable that indicates whether the individual experienced political voice in the game. It is experimentally manipulated in the game by receiving a *red* or *green* card to participate in the voting. The parameter θ captures the value of the *empowerment* created by being included in the voting process. I expect the contributions c_i to have an exponential growth with low levels of empowerment and have a flatter increase with higher empowerment levels.

The level of contribution also depends on the previous level of *empowerment* in the community and it is measured by the data collected in the survey and it can be low or high level of empowerment, $e \in \{\underline{e}, \overline{e}\}$. The previous level of empowerment also determines the level of contributions c_i and μ is the parameter. I expect the contributions c_i to have an exponential growth with low levels of empowerment and have a flatter increase with higher empowerment levels.

First order condition

$$c_i = \left(\frac{\theta P + \mu e_i}{2(1 - \delta - \alpha)}\right)^2$$

- **Not Empowerment** $\rightarrow$ If $P = 0$ then $c_i = \left(\frac{\mu e_i}{1-\alpha}\right)^2$
- **Empowerment** $\rightarrow$ If $P = 1$ then $c_i = \left(\frac{\theta + \mu e_i}{1-\alpha}\right)^2$

Implications

- When the value in one's preferences over other's α increases, contributions decrease
- When my initial empowerment is higher e_i, contributions increase

- When the value of being part of decision-making processes in the community increase, contributions increase
- When the value of participating in a decision-making process (θ) increases, contributions increase, only when the individual receives the *green card*, or voting rights.

4 Research Design

4.1 Research Context

Uganda is a country with a large degree of decentralization. The decentralization reform initiated in 1992 is the result of a historical process with its origin in the raise to power of President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni in 1986 (Steiner, 2013). During this time, the President relied strongly in the "resistance councils" or local councils, on maintaining safety and supporting the National Resistance Movement (NRM), President's political party. This reform was implemented to decrease poverty by providing communities with opportunities for participation, active response in policy-making and increasing the efficiency in the provision of Public Goods.

In Uganda the local government is formed by a five-tier system consisting of the village (LC1), parish (LC2), sub-county (LC3), county (LC4) and district (LC5). The LC5 and LC3 levels are considered local and lower local governments respectively, while the LC4, LC2 and LC1 are administrative units. The central government is responsible for providing national public goods like defense and foreign relations, as well as the implementation of large infrastructure projects and setting the priorities and guidelines of the different sectors. The second tier government, the LC5, provides the majority of services, like education (except tertiary level), health (except referral hospitals), water services and other services such as lighting, ambulances and fire brigades. The sub-county representatives implement smaller infrastructure projects, like boreholes and Community Access roads and villages implement projects related to primary education, nursery and agricultural services.

The central government distributes the budget to the districts, which is also allowed to collect its own taxes and fees. Sub-counties are the lowest tier of government that manages its own budget. Village committees are responsible for the development and implementation of projects with funds transferred by the sub-counties, as specified in the Local Government Act. The local politicians decide how to allocate the funds received from higher levels of government, within the sector to which those funds is allocated by the central government. For example, the central government allocates some money to education and the local politicians decide whether to employ more teachers, to repair school infrastructure or to build staff quarters. Furthermore, local governments receive funds donated by NGOs and civil society based organizations and are eligible to apply to intergovernmental grants.

Additionally to the official tiers described in the Local Government Act, there are other local entities that also act as decision-making bodies at local level in Uganda. 89% [4] of the primary schools in the country, held active meetings with the School Management Committee, an organization formed by representatives of the parents,

[4]National Service Delivery Survey (NSDS) report 2015

community and students (Uganda Education Act, 2008). Each health facility in the country has a Health Unit Management Committee, formed by health providers and non-political community members that monitors the daily activity of the facility. Occasionally, other committees are formed by community members to support the implementation of water, agriculture and transport projects.

As well as the process of decentralization, women's presence in the political scene is also related to the raise of NRM in power (Tamale et al. [1999]; Tripp [2000]; Goetz [2002]; Kwesiga, 1995). Before 1986, there was one woman in the national parliament composed by 126 members (Tamale et al. [1999]). The system of *reserved seats* was initiated during the bush war (1980-1985), when the NRM established that all Resistance Councils (RC) [5] had to have at least one woman (Ahikire, 2007). This system was maintained when President Museveni accessed power and persists until now; with a one-third provision for women at LC3, LC5 and national councils.

As I mentioned before, LC4, LC2 and LC1 are administrative units, governed by the Executive Committee. Their main tasks are the assistance on the implementation of district programmes, mobilization and maintenance of law. In these positions, that do not have a quota system, representation of women is still very low. In 2012, only 8% of the chief administrative officers (CAOs) [6] and 5% of the municipality town clerks (MTC) [7] were women (UNDP, 2012). In 2016 elections, 1.9% of the contestants for District Chairperson (position that does not have reserved seats) was female (DGF, 2016).

The experiment was conducted in Lira, Uganda. Lira is a district in the North region of the country, in an area affected by two decades of conflict between the Ugandan army and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The war (1985-2006) had economic impact with more than 1.1 million people displaced in the region[8]. Women gain public visibility during the war, when movement was limited and men were absent from the household. Even though their economic situation improved, their presence in community activities and political positions is still limited (Ahikire et al., 2012).

4.2 Sampling Strategy

I investigate the effect that empowerment has in social behavior in this region of Uganda, because I believe it is a relevant case in which the communities are highly involved in decision-making and women are still the minority in these institutions.

The 19 communities were selected from the list of 561 villages in the district. From the total number received from the district, I selected the villages classified as rural and merged the information with the list of public primary schools and government health centers of the area. Then, I created a final list of rural communities that had both a school and a health center in their catchment area of the parish.

[5] Resistance Councils where committees formed by nine community members that acted as decision-making bodies in the villages.

[6] There is one CAO per district and they are the head of the public service, the head of the administration of the district council and the accounting officer of the district. They are appointed by the district service commission. (Uganda Local Government Act 1997)

[7] Similar position as CAO in urban councils

[8] *Time in Between.* Report from UNHCR, 2010

From the final list, I randomly selected the 19 communities that are part of the study. 30% of them were less than 10 kilometers away from Lira town and 48% between 10 and 30. Figure 1 shows the exact geo-location of the villages.

Figure 1: Contributions by round and Treatment

The individuals that participated in the games were selected from the community following a random walk procedure. Enumerators started from a central location in the village and visited every third household to invite a member to attend a central location in the village the following day. Enumerators invited an extra 2 people per game, to serve as replacement in case of non-attendance of the original list of people. All the groups in the experiment were mixed-sex, including men and women, but some of them had majority of one of the gender. Thus, the enumerators invited people according to the gender composition of each of the groups. The only criteria used to select the people was the age (only individuals of more than 16 years old could participate) and having psychological and physical condition to play the games.

The research team met the participants in a central location of the village, often were the community meetings and social gatherings would take place. These included churches, schools and village leader's compounds. 94% of the invited individuals showed up to the game and the rest were replaced by the extra participants mobilized for that matter, always respecting the gender composition of the group. The research team was composed by two facilitators of the game and two supervisors, together with the mobilizer enumerator. In those communities in which two games were played (51% of the villages), the two groups were separated and they played simultaneously and independently, each of them facilitated by one enumerator and one supervisor.

A total of 290 subjects participated in the experiment. By design, half of them are men and the other half are women. The average age of the participants is 39 years old. It is a very homogeneous sample in terms of religion and ethnic composition, with 96% of Christians and 98% of individuals self-identifying as Langui, replicating the population in the district. Most of the participants are farmers and more than half of them only reached some level of primary education. Only 11% of the participants do not participate in any group civil society or political group. Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics of the sample.

Table 2: Summary statistics

	Male			Female		
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**N**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**N**
Age	40.493	14.825	146	36.566	11.326	143
Years of Education	6.63	3.255	146	3.962	3.02	143
HH Size	3.473	1.872	146	2.916	1.766	143
Wealth	1.61	0.913	146	1.231	0.820	143
Active	11.993	3.339	146	10.385	2.921	143
Hours	6.839	5.508	146	3.808	3.261	143
Index Wealth	0.166	1.036	146	-0.17	0.935	143
Index Comm Participation	0.316	1.031	137	-0.318	0.861	136
Index Social Empowerment	0.35	0.919	146	-0.358	0.955	143
Index Personal Empowerment	0.46	0.746	93	-0.62	0.967	69

4.3 Public Goods game with Empowerment Manipulation

To study the effect of increasing political voice of an individual in contributions to public goods, I carried out a novel and modified version of a finite repeated public goods game. Each game was played with ten participants, which played three rounds of the game. First, participants played a test round, right after the main instructions were explained. Participants were aware that the first round was a test and they were invited to ask for clarifications when needed. Then, they played two "real" rounds. At the end of the game one of the two "real" rounds was randomly chosen to be paid out. Data from the three rounds was collected and enumerators did not reveal any information between rounds. All the decisions were made privately and individually by the subjects. In order to preserve privacy, the subjects were separated by privacy panels. The instructions and the facilitation of the game was given in the local language, Langui.

In a standard Public Goods game, participants receive an endowment, E_i at the beginning of the game. They have to divide it between the *private* and the *public account*. All the contributions made by the participants to the *public account*, C_i, are summed up, $\sum C_i$, doubled and divided evenly among the total number of participants in the game. Thus, the final payoff of each subject is $E_i - C_i + (2\sum C_i/N)$.

The main difference between a standard PGG and the modified version of the PGG played in this experiment, relies in the *public account*. The contributions that participants make are summed up, doubled and used to buy a good that the community chooses, in stead of being given back to the participants. The good was delivered to the public primary school or the government health center of the village's catchment area. The complete list of these goods can be found in Table 2 of the Appendix. These goods are considered of public use and all members of the community had access to them. In order to decide which of the two public service centers received the good, the participants vote individually between *Health* and *Education*. Before the first round of the game starts, they exercise their vote by circling one of the sectors in a paper and introducing it in an envelope. This vote is binding so they cannot change it between rounds. At the end of the two rounds, the votes will be counted and the sector that gets more votes will get the good that has been bought with the money from the *public account*.

The key part of this game is the following: at the beginning of each round the participants receive a closed envelope with a card. The card can be either *Green* or *Red* and it indicates which condition the participant is assigned to. If the card is *Green*, the participant's vote is valid in the process of deciding which sector to buy the good for, i.e. if the subject votes for *Education*, that sector will get a vote. If instead the card is *Red*, that ballot will be discarded and will not be valid in the voting process. By assigning randomly a card, subjects are randomly allocated to two conditions: empowered -those that receive the green card and their vote counts - or dis-empowered. In each round there are five cards of each color. Participants only know the color of their own card, but they know how many cards of each color (five) are allocated within the participants of the group.

It is reasonable to assume that participants will contribute more money not because they have social preferences but because they are voting for the same sector they are contributing to. Thus, it would be hard to distinguish if the variation in the contribution is a reaction to the treatment or a reaction to the fact that they are increasing the probability of choosing the sector they prefer by voting for it. In order to solve this problem, I give the participants two initial endowments. One can only be used for *Education*, $E_{educ} = 10,000$ UGX and the other one for *Health*, $E_{health} = 10,000$ UGX. Ten thousand Ugandan Shillings are equivalent to $3 and represent three days earnings[9]. This amount was dispersed in 10 fake bills of 1,000 UGX each. In order to facilitate these decisions, the endowment for each sector was assigned one color, and the fake bills were of the same color as the sector.

To summarize, the participants followed the next steps. Firstly, they executed the vote for one of the two sectors. Then, in each of the two rounds, they first looked at the color of their card, which would indicate the validity (or not) of their vote. Then, they made two parallel decisions; (1) how much of the E_{health} to contribute to the *Health* account and (2) how much of the E_{educ} to contribute to the *Education* one. When the decisions were made, the facilitator randomly chose one of the two rounds. Afterwards, the facilitator counted the valid votes and announced the sector that had more of them. Then, she summed up the amount contributed to the winning sector in the selected round, doubled the amount and announced the total money in Ugandan Shillings the group had collected to buy the public good.

At the end of the game we paid out the money of the private account corresponding to the winning sector in the selected round and asked the participants to answer some questions for us in a follow-up survey. We also conducted a network survey with the participants of the game, in which the had to answer five questions related to the social attachments to the rest of the individuals. Throughout the game, the enumerators ensured a high level of confidentiality and privacy, so all the previously mentioned decisions were made individually, with no peer pressure associated with the process. About 12% of the participants did not have any formal schooling and we found that some individuals could not read nor write, in which case the enumerator helped them circle the sector selected. The facilitator made sure that the participants understood the process and was available for clarification at all times.

[9]UBOS 2010 report on monthly earnings in Uganda that assigns 117,200 UGX to rural households in North Uganda

Note that the treatment is assigned in a way that every participant changes the status by round (within subject), so in order to compare the contributions from the same individual we would need to look at the crossed-treatment cells. If we look at the same group of individuals over time, participants that received the Red card in the first round and the Green card in the second round are considered to be the empowered while the individuals that receive the green card first and the red card in the second group are the disempowered.

5 Preliminary Results

Following the theoretical framework and taking advantage of the careful design of the games, I will test three hypotheses; first, whether empowerment increases contributions to public account. Second, whether less empowered groups of the community exhibit a larger variation in the contributions due to the treatment. Last, if the gender composition of the group has an effect on contributions. I will also take advantage of a rich dataset of social network data and other variables to explore further points.

Table 3, shows the average and the standard deviation of each of the groups by round. Horizontally, *Green* indicates the group that had voting power (empowered) and *Red* the one for which their votes were not valid (dis-empowered). In the columns, we find the two rounds of the game. I compute the differences between the groups using a simple difference in means approach and show in parenthesis the standard errors of the difference.

Table 3: Mean of Contributions to Public Account by treatment and round

	Round 1	**Round 2**	**Total**	**Diff**
Green	7.48 (3.71) 144	7.69 (3.68) 144	7.59 (3.69) 288	-0.22 (0.44)
Red	7.86 (3.80) 145	7.00 (3.56) 144	7.43 (3.70) 289	0.86*** (0.43)
Total	7.67 (3.75) 289	7.35 (3.63) 288	7.51 (3.69) 577	0.32 (0.31)
Diff	-0.38 (0.44)	0.69* (0.43)	0.16 (0.31)	1.07* (0.61)

$^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

In order to test the first hypothesis of whether people with voting power contribute more than individuals that did not have voting power, we would like to compare the group of individuals that receive the *Green card* compared to the group

that receives the *Red card*. We expect to see a higher amount of average contributions in the group that has political voice in a given round. I will take advantage of the between-subject variation by round to test this statement, and use a simple difference in means test.

Table 3 shows that empowered people contribute on average 0.69 UGX more than their colleagues that did not have voting power in the second round of the game (last round of the second column). This difference is significant at 90% confidence level and it represents a decrease of 9% with respect to the average level of contributions in the game. This effect is not present in the first round of the game, which mitigates the effect of the combined sample.

Given the lack of control group, I cannot identify if this effect is caused by a factor, other than the change in political voice, that occurs between round one and two. It could be caused, for example, by the time that passes between the rounds. In Table 11 in the Appendix, I add the results of the test round. In this round the subjects are asked to do the same as in the other rounds and the status doesn't change between this round and the first one. As we can see, there is no difference between the test round and the first round. This suggest that the time is not such an important factor, although still I can not definitely rule out this factor.

Another challenge I face when analysing the results without the comparison groups is that I cannot identify if the effect is coming from those participants that experience empowerment when changing from political voice to not political voice, or those that experience dis-empowerment.

In the bottom right corner of Table 3 I compute the Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference, i.e. the difference between the differences in means of the treatment and the rounds. In practice we are comparing the individuals received the *Red card* in the first round with the ones that received the *Green card* in the second round. Given the design of the game, this is the same group of people, so this coefficient is the within group effect, or the effect of empowerment in individual i. This effect is positive and significant, suggesting that people that were empowered contributed, on average, 1.07 UGX more when they were empowered than the people that were dis-empowered.

The second hypothesis states that less empowered groups of the community exhibit a larger variation in the contributions due to the treatment. In order to test this statement I will first create several indexes that capture the level of importance of someone in the community and in the household, using variables from a post-game survey. I use the Anderson [2008] summary index, that formulates a weighted average of the standardized variables, giving more importance to those with more variance, maximizing the information included in them. The variables included in each of the indexes can be found in the Appendix in Figure 3. As observed in Table 4 women are significantly less empowered in all the dimensions we look at. For that reason, together with so I will first perform the analysis looking at gender.

Table 4: Summary Indexes of Post-game Survey

	Male			Female		
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.
Index Wealth	146	.166	1.036	143	-.17	.935
Index Participation	137	.316	1.031	136	-.318	.861
Index Social Empowerment	146	.35	.919	143	-.358	.955
Index Personal Empowerment	93	.46	.746	69	-.62	.967
Index Aggregate	86	.1	1.094	63	-.137	.845

In Table 5 and in Table 6 shows the same raw data that Table 3, separated by gender. When we do this, we observe the same pattern than in the pool sample of participants. Interestingly, the effect of empowerment in female participants is also stronger than in their male counterparts.

Table 5: Contributions to Public Account by Male participants

Male Participants				
	Round 1	**Round 2**	**Total**	**Diff**
Green	7.80 (3.81) 66	8.01 (4.02) 79	7.92 (3.91) 145	-0.21 (0.65)
Red	8.14 (4.11) 80	7.67 (3.81) 67	7.93 (3.97) 146	0.47 (0.66)
Total	7.99 (3.97) 146	7.86 (3.92) 145	7.92 (3.94) 290	0.13 (0.46)
Diff	-0.33 (0.66)	0.34 (0.65)	0.01 (0.46)	0.68 (0.93)

Table 6: Contributions to Public Account by Female participants

Female Participants				
	Round 1	**Round 2**	**Total**	**Diff**
Green	7.19 (3.60) 79	7.31 (3.20) 65	7.24 (3.41) 143	-0.12 (0.57)
Red	7.51 (3.37) 65	6.38 (3.23) 78	6.89 (3.33) 142	1.14*** (0.55)
Total	7.33 (3.49) 144	6.80 (3.24) 143	7.07 (3.37) 287	0.54 (0.40)
Diff	-0.32 (0.59)	0.94* (0.54)	0.35 (0.40)	1.25 (0.80)

To test the second hypothesis, we would like to know if this effect is higher for women that are empowered, so I run a regression of the contributions on the empowerment treatment, the female dummy variable and the interaction term between the two. I estimate the standard errors using Wild Bootstrap and clustering at game level. The results are shown in Table 7.

$$C_i = \alpha_i + \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 Female_i + \beta_3 T_i * Female_i + \epsilon$$

Results suggest that the effect of the empowerment treatment is not stronger among the female participants. In models 2 and 6 of Table 7 we observe that female players contribute on average less to the public account compared to their male counterparts. This effect is especially present in round number 2. In model 8 we find that the coefficient of the interaction effect is not significant, suggesting that female subjects that had voting power in the second round did not contribute more than male subjects. However, the sign is in the expected and the magnitude is about half of the negative coefficient of the female.

Table 7: Second prediction: Treatment has stronger effect on Women

	Contributions Round 1				Contributions Round 2			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treat: Green	-0.38		-0.31	-0.31	0.69*		0.58	0.27
	(0.34)		(0.35)	(0.54)	(0.40)		(0.41)	(0.57)
Female		-0.66*	-0.63*	-0.63		-1.07***	-1.02***	-1.33**
		(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.58)		(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.52)
Treat * Fem				0.00				0.62
				(0.79)				(0.85)
Constant	7.86***	8.00***	8.14***	8.14***	7.00***	7.89***	7.58***	7.74***
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.43)	(0.47)
Observations	289	288	288	288	288	287	287	287

Standard errors clustered at game level and estimated using Wild Bootstrap

Standard errors are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

As we discussed before, gender is not the only characteristic that indicates the position an individual holds in the community. For that reason, I run the same regression as before with the indexes created for the other characteristics. In Table 8 and Table 9 we see the results for contributions to the first and the second round. For all the indexes, I run a regression with the index and one with the interaction term between the index and the treatment (having voting power).

In the first round, people that are empowered in the community contribute on average more than the people that are not empowered, as the coefficient of Model 5 in Table 8 suggests. We also find evidence that the individuals that participate the most in the community and have voting power contribute more (model 4). In the second round these effects disappear, as we see in 9. In this round wealthier people of the community that receive the green card contribute significantly more than the poorer people. These results do not support the second hypothesis.

Table 8: Treatment on Contributions

	(1) R1	(2) R1	(3) R1	(4) R1	(5) R1	(6) R1	(7) R1	(8) R1	(9) R1	(10) R1
Treat: Green	-0.36	-0.36	-0.31	-0.31	-0.36	-0.36	0.07	0.07	0.12	0.11
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.36)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.59)	(0.61)	(0.61)	(0.61)
Wealth Ix	-0.11	-0.35								
	(0.21)	(0.27)								
Treat*Wealth		0.46								
		(0.40)								
Participat Ix			0.22	-0.31						
			(0.19)	(0.25)						
Treat*Participt				1.09***						
				(0.42)						
Social Empow Ix					0.45**	0.43				
					(0.18)	(0.33)				
Treat*Soc						0.05				
						(0.46)				
Pers Empow Ix							-0.15	0.05		
							(0.37)	(0.61)		
Treat*Pers								-0.39		
								(0.74)		
Aggreg Ix									-0.07	-0.38
									(0.26)	(0.44)
Treat*All										0.76
										(0.76)
Constant	7.85***	7.85***	7.84***	7.86***	7.85***	7.85***	7.98***	7.97***	8.02***	8.02***
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.56)	(0.57)	(0.58)	(0.57)
Observations	288	288	272	272	288	288	161	161	148	148

Standard errors estimated using Wild Bootstrap. Clustered at game level.

Standard errors are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 9: Treatment on Contributions

	(1) R2	(2) R2	(3) R2	(4) R2	(5) R2	(6) R2	(7) R2	(8) R2	(9) R2	(10) R2
Treat: Green	0.67*	0.67*	0.61	0.63	0.66*	0.66*	0.06	0.06	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.62)	(0.63)	(0.63)	(0.63)
Wealth Ix	0.03	0.40								
	(0.22)	(0.29)								
Treat*Wealth		-0.79**								
		(0.37)								
Participat Ix			0.11	0.55**						
			(0.16)	(0.26)						
Treat*Participt				-0.87**						
				(0.38)						
Social Empow Ix					0.41	0.38				
					(0.17)	(0.26)				
Treat*Soc						0.06				
						(0.43)				
Pers Empow Ix							0.12	0.09		
							(0.37)	(0.39)		
Treat*Pers								0.05		
								(0.80)		
Aggreg Ix									-0.02	0.44
									(0.25)	(0.27)
Treat*All										-0.77
										(0.63)
Constant	7.03***	7.02***	7.08***	7.09***	7.03***	7.03***	7.71***	7.71***	7.82***	7.82***
	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.47)	(0.47)
Observations	287	287	271	271	287	287	161	161	148	148

Standard errors estimated using Wild Bootstrap. Clustered at game level.
Standard errors are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Lastly, we test the third prediction that states that women would contribute more in groups in which the majority of participants are of their same gender. In order to test it, I use the variation in the gender composition of the groups. I regress the contributions to the public account on the treatment at game level and the interaction with female to identify the effect this treatment has in female participants. I use, as before, Wild Bootstrap to estimate standard errors and I cluster at game level. Results are presented in Table 10. Model 1 and 2 use contributions in the first and second round respectively as a dependent variable. In Model 3, I use all the contributions available and control for the round. There is no evidence of an effect of the composition of the group on the contributions.

Table 10: Treatment on Contributions

	(1) Contributions Round 1	(2) Contributions Round 2	(3) Contributions Total
Treatment: Majority Women Group	-0.10	-0.05	-0.08
	(1.00)	(0.91)	(0.95)
Female	-0.50	-1.06***	-0.78**
	(0.52)	(0.38)	(0.36)
Treatment * Female	-0.18	0.03	-0.08
	(0.78)	(0.61)	(0.63)
Constant	8.03***	7.90***	7.97***
	(0.49)	(0.45)	(0.46)
Observations	288	287	575

Standard errors estimated using Wild Bootstrap. Clustered at game level.
Standard errors are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

6 Discussion of the Results

In the previous section we found that participants that had political voice in the group contributed slightly more than those individuals that were not able to vote. We have also seen that this effect only shows when the status of the participants change. In this section I would like to explain these results and explore possible channels which might be driving them.

The treatment effect of the empowerment appears only in the second round of the game. If participants are not changing the level of contributions when they move from one round to another, the fact that there is a significant effect in the second round suggests that they are reacting to the change in their status in the game. Thus, the treatment has an effect as an empowering (or dis-empowering) effect between rounds. This is, partially, consistent with anecdotal evidence in the field, where individuals accept the status given or assigned to them by authority in schools, institutions and community dynamics.

Regarding the third hypothesis, we do not find that women contribute differently in groups with majority women, contradicting Greig and Bohnet [2009] and Fearon et al. [2017]. These authors play Public Goods game in a slum in Nairobi and in rural Liberia, respectively. They find that women contribute more in all-women groups than in mixed-sex ones. This is in part consistent with our results, given that we only have mixed-sex groups, with majority women, but never all-women groups. Fearon and Humphreys argue that their results are driven by women having higher intrinsic motivation in same-sex groups but not with women having more community-minded objectives.

The results suggest that empowered individuals contribute more than the ones that do not have voting power in a decision that affects the community. Furthermore, this effect is only present when the participants experience the change on status in the group, suggesting that they are sensitive to changes in the social position.

This study is relevant for policies that involve community programs in the context of informal institutions. The positive effect of the empowerment, taking into account the decrease of the contributions, suggest that empowering those minority groups of the communities will result in an increasing in contributions to community. In a context in which contributions to community are important for service delivery quality, this effect will increase overall welfare of the whole community.

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Appendix

Figure 2: List of goods offered to the Community

HEALTH

Item	Price - UGX	Unit
Soap	**2,000**	Bar
Thermometer	**3,000**	Piece
Sanitary Pads	**3,000**	Pad
Stethoscope	**7,000**	Piece
Cotton Wools	**8,000**	Box
Gloves	**10,000**	Box
Mama Kit	**15,000**	Kit
Blood Pressure Machine	**20,000**	Machine
Printer	**200,000**	Piece
Bicycle	**250,000**	Unit

EDUCATION

Item	Price - UGX	Unit
Soap	**2,000**	Bar
Pencils	**2,000**	Package
Sanitary Pads	**3,000**	Pad
Tennis Ball	**10,000**	Piece
Notebooks	**15,000**	Dozen
Movable Black Board	**15,000**	Unit
Black Board Ruler	**15,000**	Unit
Pens	**20,000**	Box
Text Book	**25,000**	Unit
Wall Clock	**25,000**	Unit
Hand Bell	**35,000**	Unit
Net	**40,000**	Unit
Ball	**50,000**	Unit
Chock	**70,000**	Box
First Aid Kit	**90,000**	Kit
Printer	**200,000**	Piece
Bicycle	**250,000**	Unit

Figure 3: Variables for Index creation

Wealth Index	Community Participation Index	Social Empowerment Index	Personal Empowerment Index
Which of these items do you personally own? • Radio • Television • Motor vehicle or motorcycle • Mobile Phone	Could you tell me whether you are a member or participant in one of these organizations and your level of involvement? • Drama, music, dance, sport club • Religious, prayer or bible-study group • Saving and credit group • Worker union, farmer cooperative, artisan or women's cooperative • Lower-government level • Political Party	Please think of the most influential person in your village, and the least influential person in the village. If we rank the most influential person highly as 7 and the least influential person lowly as 1, how would you rank the influence of your opinion in the community compared to this people?	Are you the head of the household?
	In the last 6 months, how many hours have you spent doing work in one of the following community activities that would benefit people in your village? • Repairing road passes through your village/parish • Road slashing/sweeping • Maintenance borehole/spring wells • Cleaning health facility • Garbage burning • Other	If there is any community gathering or meeting in which people are supposed to give their opinion, do you usually participate in it (address the participants)?	Who brought more things in terms of value to the union at the time of marriage, you or your spouse?
	In the last six months, did you attend any LC1 community meeting in the village?	How much do you think your opinion matters in the community?	Do you bring any money home?
	Thinking of the last LC1 community meeting you attended, did you speak in it?	If you had to propose something to the community, like a new idea, an improvement or an issue to rise to your district leaders, how much, from 1 to 5 you think it will be taken into account?	Would you say the money you bring home is more than your husband/wife brings home, less than what he/she earns or about the same?
	In the last six months, did you attend any community activity in the village?	Have you ever thought of running for a leadership position (community leader, political leader, savings group leader…) even if you didn't do it at the end?	Do you keep any money for yourself (either for savings or expenses)?
			If your child falls sick today, who in the household will decide to bring him/her to the health facility, you, your spouse or both?
			In your household, who pays the majority of the school fees over the past 12 months, you, your spouse or both?
			Do you live with your in-laws?

Table 11: Contributions to Public Account

	Round 0	**Round 1**	**Diff**
Green	7.85 (3.47) 144	7.48 (3.71) 144	0.37 (3.24)
Red	7.87 (3.85) 143	7.86 (3.80) 145	0.04 (3.84)
Diff	0.03 (0.43)	0.38 (0.44)	