Working Paper NOVAFRICA: “Measuring corruption in the field using behavioral games”

Um novo working paper foi adicionado à série NOVAFRICA Working Paper Series. Escrito por Alex Armand, Alexander Coutts, Pedro Vicente e Inês Vilela, este paper apresenta um inovador  “jogo” de corrupção de forma a caracterizar a interação entre líderes políticos e cidadãos, no norte de Moçambique.

Título: Measuring corruption in the field using behavioral games

Alex Armand (Nova School of Business and Economics, CEPR, Institute for Fiscal Studies and NOVAFRICA)
Alexander Coutts (Schulich School of Business, York University, and NOVAFRICA)
Pedro C. Vicente (Nova School of Business and Economics, BREAD and NOVAFRICA)
Inês Vilela Royal (Holloway – University of London, and NOVAFRICA)

Corruption is often harmful for economic development, yet it is difficult to measure due to its illicit nature. We propose a novel corruption game to characterize the interaction between actual political leaders and citizens and implement it in Northern Mozambique.
Contrary to the game-theoretic prediction, both leaders and citizens engage in corruption. Importantly, corruption in the game is correlated with real-world corruption by leaders: citizens send bribes to leaders whom we observe appropriating community money, and these leaders are likely to reciprocate the bribes. In corrupt behavior, we identify an important trust dimension captured by a standard trust game.

Poderá encontrar mais informações aqui.