Na quarta-feira, 18 de outubro, pelas 14h30, o Centro NOVAFRICA recebe Lorenzo Casaburi, da Universidade de Zurique, para apresentar o seu trabalho.
Lorenzo Casaburi (Universidade de Zurique)
Failures in saving markets can spill over into other markets: When producers are saving constrained, trustworthy buyers can offer infrequent delayed payments, a saving tool, and purchase at a lower price, thus departing from standard trade credit logic. This paper develops a model of this interlinkage and tests it in the context of the Kenyan dairy industry. Multiple data sources, experiments, and a calibration exercise support the microfoundations and predictions of the model concerning: i) producers’ demand for infrequent payments; ii) heterogeneity across buyers in the ability to supply infrequent payments; iii) a segmented market equilibrium where buyers compete by providing either liquidity or saving services to producers; iv) low supply response to price increases. We provide additional evidence from other settings, including labor markets, and discuss policy implications concerning contract enforcement, financial access, and market structure.
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